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ABSTRACT 
 
Federal circuit courts offer conflicting interpretations of 
when an employee violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA) by accessing an employer’s computer system 
without authorization. Enacted originally as an anti-hacker 
statute, the language of the CFAA proves ambiguous when 
courts attempt to apply its sanctions to individuals given 
access to a computer (such as an employee by an employer). 
Circuit Courts have interpreted the statute differently, 
generally applying one of two theories to reach their 
interpretations: (1) agency theory; or (2) looking to the plain 
language of the statute and the rule of lenity. These differing 
interpretations have resulted in varying outcomes when 
employers seek to sanction employees for violating the Act. 
Employers face tough questions about when and how to seek 
sanctions when employees potentially violate their rights of 
computer access. This Article takes an in-depth look at the 
varying interpretations among the circuits and considers a 
number of district court cases and their application of the 
CFAA. 
 
                                                                                                         
* Amber L. Leaders, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2011. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)1
The principle interpretations come from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits.
 both criminalizes 
unauthorized access to certain private computer systems and allows 
parties harmed by such access to bring civil actions for compensatory 
damages and injunctive relief. With the growing use of computers by 
employees at all levels, however, companies increasingly face the 
loss of sensitive data through internal acts – violations by their own 
workers. The language of the CFAA is ambiguous about whether the 
Act should apply to these internal violators. Thus, federal circuits 
have split on what it means to be without or to exceed authorized 
access under the CFAA.  
2 In International 
Airport Centers L.L.C. v. Citrin,3 the Seventh Circuit used agency 
law to determine when authorization by an employee begins and 
ends; under this interpretation, an employee violates the CFAA when 
the agency relationship is severed and thus authorization is 
constructively rescinded. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in LVRC 
Holdings LLC v. Brekka4
                                                                                                         
1  18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 interpreted the statute according to its plain 
language to determine when an employee lacks authorization. The 
2  See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); LVRC 
Holdings LLC, v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
3  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 423. 
4  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134. 
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Ninth Circuit finds a violation of the CFAA only when no 
authorization has ever been given or when authorization has 
affirmatively been rescinded by an employer.5
 
 For any employer 
seeking damages or injunctive relief against a rogue employee, it will 
be important to consider the branches of interpretation as well as the 
many offshoots in each of the district courts. This Article examines 
the Citrin and Brekka decisions and considers cases from the district 
courts to determine how these varying analyses affect employers 
faced with the threat of computer-system breaches. 
I. THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE CFAA 
 
The difficulty in interpretation of the CFAA arises from the origin 
of the statute. Enacted in 1984 to help the federal government 
prosecute computer crimes, Congress designed the CFAA to target 
hackers who “break in” to systems.6 But the CFAA has grown from 
protecting only “federal interest computers” to guarding any 
“protected computer.”7 Further, the original incarnation was solely a 
criminal statute, but the scope of the CFAA has gradually expanded 
through legislative enhancements to include a private right of action.8
Section 1030 prohibits five categories of conduct: (1) theft of 
computer data; (2) unauthorized access with intent to defraud;  
 
That private action allows an individual to seek civil remedies when 
he or she has suffered loss or damages as a result of someone else’s 
improper access. 
                                                                                                         
5  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135.  
6  Fishman and McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping §26:1(2010); see 
also Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining 
Employees' Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 819, 820 (2009). 
7  A “protected computer” is any computer “which is used in interstate or 
foreign commerce or communication.” 18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(2)(B) (West 2008). This 
broad definition encompasses nearly every computer since any connection to the 
internet satisfies this requirement; see Daniel J. Winters & John F. Costello, Jr., The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A new weapon in the trade secrets litigation 
arena, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 2005), available at 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs1252
%5C1002%5CISBA_IP_article.pdf. 
8  Winters & Costello, supra note 5.  
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(3) unauthorized access resulting in destruction; (4) trafficking in 
computer passwords; and (5) extortion by threat of damage to a 
computer.9
The CFAA states in relevant part that whoever “
 All but the fifth category contain the qualifying language 
“without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access.” These two 
phrases are the root of the dispute between the various circuits. 
intentionally 
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized 
access, and thereby obtains … information contained in a financial 
record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer … or contained in 
a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer” commits a 
federal crime.10
Because the original purpose of the CFAA was to keep third 
parties from illegally accessing others’ computers and information, 
the language regarding authorization can be unclear when applied to 
an employee who has been given a degree of authorization by the 
employer. Courts have struggled to apply this anti-hacker statute 
when the offender is not a third party but someone who has been 
given access to the computer, such as an employee. 
 Courts employ different methods in applying the 
language of “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access” 
to a computer. 
 
II. THE SPLIT BETWEEN CITRIN AND BREKKA 
 
The circuit split centers on when employees have authorization to 
access computer systems. The Seventh Circuit uses agency law to 
define the boundaries of authorization. In Citrin, it held that when an 
employee violates his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer, 
all access authorization ceases.11 The Ninth Circuit recently offered 
an alternative interpretation of the same statutory language.12 Using 
the “plain language” of the CFAA, that court determined that the 
CFAA has narrower parameters for what constitutes a violation.13
                                                                                                         
9  Id. 
 
District courts have varied in their application of the two 
interpretations, with most following the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.  
10  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). 
11  Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).  
12  LVRC Holdings LLC, v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009).  
13  Id. 
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A.  The Seventh Circuit and Agency Law 
 
In Citrin, the Seventh Circuit applied agency theory to interpret 
the vague language regarding authorization in the CFAA.14 Citrin 
was an employee of International Airport Centers (IAC), which 
loaned Citrin a laptop for work. He decided to go into business for 
himself, in breach of an employment contract.15 Before departing, 
Citrin deleted numerous files that implicated his intent to develop a 
competing business using IAC’s data from his loaned laptop. Beyond 
deleting the files, Citrin utilized a special program designed to 
overwrite deleted files, thus making them unrecoverable. He had been 
given access by IAC to the computer and to the files. IAC alleged the 
deleted files implicated Citrin and that was why they were deleted. 
The company sought civil remedies against Citrin under the CFAA 
for accessing data without authorization and for wrongfully 
transmitting information.16
The Citrin court held that an employee’s authorization to access a 
computer ends for purposes of the CFAA when the employee violates 
her duty of loyalty to the employer.
  
17  Under agency theory, an 
employee violates that duty when he or she determines to act 
wrongfully or break loyalty (such as by taking another job) with the 
employer.18 The court determined that Citrin violated his fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to IAC and therefore acted “without authorization” in 
accessing the files.19 This decision was the primary appellate 
interpretation of the authorization language in the CFAA20
 
 until the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brekka.  
                                                                                                         
14  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420. 
15  Id. at 419. 
16  Id. 
17  Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21. 
18  Restatement (Third) of Agency, §8.01 (2006).  
19  Id.  
20  The First Circuit also considers the issue, but offers a similar interpretation 
as the Seventh Circuit and the Citrin case is the one generally cited as the primary 
authority. See Nick Akerman, Time to Review Corporate Computer Policies, NAT'L 
L.J. (Feb. 3, 2010), http://computerfraud.us/files/2010/03/Time-to-Review-
Computer-Policies-v1.pdf . 
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B.  The Ninth Circuit and Plain Language Interpretation 
 
In September 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided Brekka, another 
case involving an employee’s improper use of company files. The 
Ninth Circuit was “unpersuaded by [the] interpretation” of the 
Seventh Circuit.21 Instead, the court considered the plain language of 
the statute and the rule of lenity for criminal or quasi-criminal 
statutes.22
The Brekka court first noted that the CFAA is primarily a 
criminal statute, although Brekka was a civil case,
 LVRC Holdings employed Brekka to manage one of its 
treatment facilities. As part of this position, Brekka received access to 
the computer system and full access to any files or records. During 
his employment, Brekka travelled between his work in Nevada and 
his home in Florida. He often transmitted files between his work and 
home computers. He eventually decided to start his own business and 
dumped a number of files, including confidential information, from 
his work computer to his home laptop. LVRC Holdings sought civil 
damages against him for violation of the CFAA.  
23 and determined 
that as a criminal statute the rule of lenity should be applied in 
interpreting any ambiguity of language.24 The rule of lenity mandates 
that courts interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the 
defendant in order to avoid unexpected burdens.25 According to the 
court, the “rule of lenity, which is rooted in considerations of notice, 
requires courts to limit the reach of criminal statutes to the clear 
import of their text and construe any ambiguity against the 
government.”26 The court specifically cited Citrin and stated that 
applying agency theory in these cases would lead to confusion for 
defendants because such an interpretation is not implied by the plain 
language of the statute.27
                                                                                                         
21  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134. 
 
22  Id. at 1134-35.  
23  The CFAA is a criminal statute, but it provides civil remedies in addition 
to criminal penalties. Fishman and McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping 
§26:1 (2010).  
24  Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134.  
25  Id.  
26  Id. at 1135(citing United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
27  Id.  
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The Brekka Court then considered the plain language of the 
statute to determine the meaning of authorization.28 The court defined 
“authorization” to access a company’s computer as “when the 
employer gives the employee permission to use it.”29
The court further opined that Brekka could not have violated the 
CFAA under “exceeds authorized access” because he only accessed 
the computer as the company had allowed. The CFAA addresses 
access, not use, according to the Ninth Circuit. What the employee 
does with materials after properly accessing them does not bring the 
employee’s actions under the sanctions of the CFAA.
 The court 
reasoned that the CFAA’s plain language says nothing about an 
employee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty. Authorization begins and ends 
with the employer, not the employee, under this view. An employee 
acts without authorization only if the employer never gives 
permission or affirmatively rescinds permission. The court 
determined that Brekka was not liable under the CFAA because the 
LVRC had authorized his access to the computer. In the court’s view, 
this was not “without authorization” as the statute requires.  
30
The Ninth Circuit is the first federal appellate court to apply this 
reasoning. However, the Brekka Court’s rationale is not new. Prior to 
the Brekka opinion, district courts had applied similar logic when 
interpreting the terms “authorization” and “authorized access.” 
  
The interpretations from the Citrin and Brekka decisions provide 
the guideposts for other interpretations of the CFAA. Other circuits 
have interpreted the statute similarly, with some minor variation.31
                                                                                                         
28  Id. 
 
29  Id. at 1133.  
30  Id. at 1135. 
31  See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 
2001)(supporting the Citrin analysis, but noting use of “scraper” program 
“exceeded authorized access,” assuming program's speed and efficiency depended 
on breach of confidentiality agreement with former employer); ReMedPar, Inc. v. 
AllParts Medical, LLC, 683 F.Supp.2d 605, 613 (M.D.Tenn 2010)(following the 
Brekka reasoning, but attaching legislative history analysis as well); Bro-tech Corp. 
v. Thermax, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 378, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2009)(supporting the Brekka 
reasoning, but noting that whether an employee who had deleted emails from his 
company computer before discharge had exceeded authorized access is a question 
of fact for a jury); Cenveo, Inc. v. Rao, 659 F. Supp. 2d 312, 317 (D. Conn. 
2009)(stating transmission of confidential information via computer is not enough, 
but can only exceed access if the information accessed was in the computer).  
7
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The reasoning of Brekka has been more widely adopted and can be 
found in district court cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.32 Most of these apply an almost identical 
analysis to that of the Brekka case, though the Second and Fourth 
Circuits have slight variations.33
 
 In these cases, courts often find an 
employee is without authorization only when he or she never received 
access to particular data or systems. Once an employee receives 
access to a system, an employer has little recourse under the Ninth 
Circuit interpretation of “without authorization.” 
C.  Beyond Citrin and Brekka: The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
Interpretations of the CFAA  
 
Two circuit court decisions following Brekka further outline the 
nuances of applying §1030(a)(2)(B), particularly to employees who 
exceed authorized access. Both decisions highlight the importance of 
the employee’s knowledge. The Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. John34 noted 
that “an authorized computer user ‘has reason to know’ that he or she 
is not authorized to access data or information in furtherance of a 
criminally fraudulent scheme” and thus violates the CFAA by 
acting.35 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that notice to the employee of his 
access limits could be dispositive in determining whether 
authorization was exceeded.36
In John, the Fifth Circuit considered the “exceeds authorization” 
language of the CFAA.
  Both decisions seem to distinguish, 
rather than dispute, the holding in Brekka. 
37
                                                                                                         
32  Though this Article uses Brekka as a guidepost, many of the referenced 
district court cases applied the same line of reasoning as Brekka prior to the Brekka 
decision.  
 The court held that employers have broader 
protections against rogue employees than under the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation. Unlike many of the other cases, the actions of the 
33  Cenveo, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (noting a distinction where accused did not 
access information “in a computer”); Werner-Masuda, 390 F.Supp.2d at 499 
(noting distinction where the act is unauthorized disclosure of information rather 
than unauthorized access to information).  
34  U.S. v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).  
35  John, 597 F.3d at 273. 
36  United States v. Rodriguez, 628F.3d, 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010).  
37  John, 597 F.3d at 273-73. 
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employee in John were criminal both under the CFAA and separate 
criminal fraud statutes. The employee accessed employer information 
and bank account records and used the information to defraud 
customers. Furthermore, the employer told the defendant that such 
access was prohibited and beyond the scope of what was 
authorized.38 The court determined that the defendant’s access 
exceeded authorization, stating that access “to a computer and data 
that can be obtained from that access may be exceeded if the purposes 
for which access has been given are exceeded.”39
The Fifth Circuit drew an important distinction from the Brekka 
case; the court noted that “the Ninth Circuit may have a different 
view” on how it interpreted the “exceeds authorization” language.
  
40 
In Brekka, the court had determined that if an employer had not 
affirmatively rescinded authorization, an employee “would have no 
reason to know” that personal use might also violate the CFAA.41 
The John court stated that in its case, the reasoning that the employee 
“had no reason to know” did not apply.42
The violator in John had not only accessed employer data but had 
done so in “furtherance of a criminally fraudulent scheme.”
 
43 The 
Fifth Circuit stated that “when an employee knows that the purpose 
for which she is accessing information in a computer is both in 
violation of an employer's policies and is part of an illegal scheme, it 
would be ‘proper’ to conclude that such conduct ‘exceeds authorized 
access’ within the meaning of § 1030(a)(2).”44
                                                                                                         
38  Id. at 272.  
  This interpretation of 
the phrase “exceeds authorized access” broadens the application of 
the CFAA beyond what the Ninth Circuits and other courts apply, but 
stops short of the employer-friendly holding in Citrin. Rather than 
providing blanket protection for employees given access by the 
employer, the Fifth Circuit imposes an important limitation on 
employees who violate employer policies and do so as part of an 
illegal act. This gives employers some remedies against gross 
39  Id.  
40  Id.  
41  Id. at 273 (citing Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134). 
42  Id.  
43  Id.  
44  Id.  
9
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violations by employees – even employees previously granted access 
– but does not extend to employees who merely disregard the 
employer’s expectation of loyalty.  
The Eleventh Circuit decided in U.S. v. Rodriguez that notice to 
the employee that accessing information, otherwise normally 
authorized, outside the scope of normal business reasons was 
prohibited met the plain language of the CFAA.45 The employer, 
Teleservice, had advised Rodriguez that accessing the personal 
information databases was only authorized for business reasons.46 
Any access outside of that scope was prohibited. Furthermore, 
Rodriguez readily admitted that he was aware of this policy and had 
accessed “things that were not authorized.”47
The court distinguishes its holding from both the Brekka and John 
decisions. The court states that this case differs from Brekka in that 
the employer there had not provided any such notice to the employee 
regarding the prohibited access.
  
48 The court distinguishes John on the 
grounds that Rodriguez’s lack of criminal use of the information (as 
required by John), “is irrelevant if he obtained the information 
without authorization or as a result of exceeding authorized access.”49
 
 
The court does not reach the John standard because, unlike in John, 
Rodriguez exceeded his authorized access by violating a known 
policy of the employer.  
III. WHAT CAN EMPLOYERS DO? A LOOK AT  
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS 
 
Employers should be careful to consider whether an employee 
acted without authorization or exceeded authorized access because 
circuit courts interpret the terms of the CFAA differently. Courts that 
follow the Citrin approach favor a broader acceptance of 
contractually setting up boundaries for authorization, for instance 
through confidentiality, employment, and noncompete agreements. In 
jurisdictions following Citrin’s agency law approach, employers have 
                                                                                                         
45  United States v. Rodriguez, 628F.3d, 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). 
46  Id. at 1260.  
47  Id. at 1262.  
48  Id. at 1263 
49  Id. 
10
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol6/iss4/4
2011] DECIPHERING “AUTHORIZATION” UNDER THE CFAA 295 
more power to set up the boundaries that they want individual 
employees to follow. Specificity in employment agreements is not as 
crucial because of the loyalty requirements under agency theory that 
give employers a remedy regardless. But a best practice will be to 
make employment agreements specific enough to outline employee 
expectations of what could break the agency relationship. The more 
important issue in determining liability is whether an employee acted 
disloyally towards the employer or acted with wrongful purpose. 
Under the Brekka analysis or similar interpretation, employers 
should limit the access of lower-level employees and expand access 
only when necessary. The larger question for employers under the 
Brekka analysis is what to do with those employees that require 
extensive access to data and systems. Those types of employees leave 
employers most vulnerable to breaches of confidentiality and 
noncompete agreements. Under Brekka, an employer’s recourse may 
be limited under the CFAA. Even having confidentiality agreements, 
employment agreements, and computer policies does not always save 
employers in these circuits.  
The John court sets forth a middle ground. An employer cannot 
use the “without authorization” language of the CFAA as a sword to 
parry employees already given access. But an employer may have 
some remedies under “exceeds authorized access.” An employee who 
uses information obtained from a computer system as part of a 
criminal scheme when subject to a detailed employee computer-use 
policy that states exactly when an employee exceeds access probably 
violates the CFAA.  
Rodriguez goes one step further, stating that a detailed policy by 
the employer and a demonstration that the employee had knowledge 
of that policy is enough to show access was not authorized or 
exceeded authorization under the CFAA. Under those circumstances, 
whether an employee planned to use the information as part of a 
criminal scheme is irrelevant. Knowledge and violation of the 
employer’s policy can be sufficient to demonstrate the employee 
exceeded authorized access.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Employers should strive to limit computer access to employees 
and to clearly communicate computer-use policies to those with 
11
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access. The courts generally apply the CFAA in favor of employees. 
However, some circuits are giving employers a fighting chance. The 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit rulings give more ground to employers. 
The best defense for employers is not to rely on the CFAA as a 
remedy but to limit access of employees to sensitive data and to be 
clear about what those limits are through detailed policies, computer-
use agreements, and records demonstrating employees’ knowledge of 
those policies.   
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